Saturday, October 31, 2015

Dispensing survivors' justice in Zanzibar

In the wake of the situation in Zanzibar, let us revisit this article:

Dispensing survivors' justice in Zanzibar

Chambi Chachage

2010-04-15, Issue 477

Recent developments in Zanzibar's politics require serious historical scrutiny. It is not by accident we are now being bombarded with what transpired before and during the revolution. Why now?

If you happen to be internet savvy you might have come across a video of the ‘bloody revolution’ that is circulating online. One can sense that its aim is to debunk the revolution. It is coming in the aftermath of a quest to commemorate Zanzibar’s ill-fated independence of 1963. I say ill-fated because its government was the one that was overthrown in the 1964 revolution.

One cannot dispute the historical fact that the political landscape in Zanzibar continues to be shaped by the build-up to this revolution. The bitterness has not yet disappeared among its polarised survivors. As an attempt to resolve this seemingly never-ending animosity, a number of great political negotiators have called for a ‘muafaka’ (accord) based on a coalition government.

Chief among these reconciliatory figures are Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, Chief Emeka Anyaoku and Professor Haroub Othman, to name but a few. It is well-documented how they relentlessly called for a government of national unity in Zanzibar. One of them even attempted to mediate.

Two key players have now been added to the equation. The Citizen (7 April 2010) notes that way back in 1958 Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of the then newly independent Ghana, advised Abeid Amani Karume and his political opponents to 'work together, win elections together, and win independence together' in Zanzibar. 'Karume', The Citizen further cites its source, 'accepted the idea and started advocating a unity government as the proper mode of governance.'

The source, Salum Rashid Maulid, who was the first secretary of the Revolutionary Council, affirms that Karume expressed this desire for a government of national unity in 1962 at the Constitutional Conference in London, suggesting that it 'would eliminate political differences among Zanzibaris'. But in 1963 a controversial election did not fulfil that desire. Then the revolution was broadcast in 1964. What has happened since then has been a political rollercoaster.

To put an end to this political instability – which tends to reach its peak during elections – the president of Zanzibar, Amani Abeid Karume, and the leader of the main opposition party, Seif Sharif Hamad, are now on ‘talking terms’. In fact what is happening between them is unprecedented. Seif has even made 'a surprise return to the Zanzibar headquarters of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), 20 years after quitting the ruling party' (The Citizen, 8 April 2010).

All these reconciliatory moves are ‘long overdue’ affirmations on the need to embrace what the author of ‘Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror', Professor Mahmood Mamdani, refers to as ‘survivors’ justice’. This justice, as opposed to ‘victors’ justice, 'seeks to reconcile rather than to punish, to look forward rather than backward'. It is a more relevant way of dispensing justice in 'a continent where a relentless pursuit of justice in the post-independence period had all too often turned into vengeance'. Why? Because there is no winner to take it all!

Mamdani further elaborates: 'If peace and justice are to be complementary, rather than conflicting, objectives, we need to distinguish victor’s justice from survivors’ justice: If one insists on distinguishing right from wrong, the other seeks to reconcile different rights. In a situation in which there is no winner and thus no possibility for victor’s justice, survivors’ justice may indeed be the only form of justice possible.' He then presents South Africa as a case study.

Thus: 'If Nuremberg is being turned into the paradigm for victors’ justice, the postapartheid transition in South Africa needs to be acknowledged as the paradigm for survivors’ justice. The end of Apartheid in South Africa was driven by two terms – forgive but do not forget – agreed upon at Kempton Park. The first part of the compact was that the new power will forgive all past transgressions of the law, as long as they are publicly acknowledged as wrongs. There will be no prosecutions. The second was that there will be no forgetting, which is why henceforth rules of conduct must change, thereby ensuring a transition to a postapartheid order.' This is continuing.

But can all this apply to Zanzibar? Yes. Why? Simply because of the conflicting legacy of the revolution. As Mamdani correctly observes, South Africa is not an isolated example, rather, 'it is actually a prototype for conflicts raging across the African continent.' From what we have seen in the 1995, 2000 and 2005 elections Zanzibar, as it is now politically, is a ticking bomb that can easily explode and lead to a number of conflicts. Do we know what will happen in the 2010 elections?

Let us go back at the drawing board and dispense a form of justice fitting for Zanzibar. So far, I am fully convinced, such form can only be survivors’ justice. Only a win–win situation will do.


* Chambi Chachage is a co-editor of 'Africa's Liberation: the Legacy of Nyerere', forthcoming from Pambazuka Press.
* Chambi Chachage's blog can be found at
* © Chambi Chachage
* Please send comments to or comment online at Pambazuka News.


Let your voice be heard. Comment on this article.
Hamoud are you sure you understood that article? I think in a way Zanzibar has done what the article was advocating!
Chambi Chachage
The author prophsy on Zanzibar ahd been prooved wrong. Zanzibar nowa is free from internal strife and moving forward to National building!
Hamoud "Zancorps"

Friday, October 30, 2015

Will Magufuli undo the Economy of Corruption?

When Hazel Gray published her article on 'The political economy of grand corruption in Tanzania', following a detailed PhD study on the subject, Mathew Bukhi presented a critical summary below. With the elections of John Magufuli as the President-Elect, following the seemingly 'cancelling out' of the Network (Mtandao), one wonders whether this is the indeed beginning of the end of grand corruption (Ufisadi). What remains to be seen is whether the remnant of the grand masters of Ufisadi in the Tanzanian Grand Old Party will stick to their guns, lay low or give way to the hailed Bulldozer (Tingatinga).

Download the article in the link below, it was just published yesterday.

Here is its abstract:


This article examines the political economy of grand corruption in Tanzania in the era of rapid growth and global integration. Grand corruption in Tanzania is linked to intra-elite conflicts within the ruling CCM party. However, the underlying dynamics of these struggles and how such elite politics interacts with the wider process of socio-economic transformation unfolding in Tanzania are not well understood. This article draws on the political settlements approach in building an analytical framework to examine four major grand corruption scandals that occurred within public finance from 2000 until 2014. In particular, it sets out the key actors and patterns in the factional struggles over corruption in order to demonstrate how the elite within the ruling CCM party is not centralized but composed instead of internal factions that have equal weight. The article explains how the enduring control of this elite, despite its internal divisions, can be explained by examining the balance of power in society beyond the institutions of the ruling party or the state itself. The article then establishes the mechanisms through which grand corruption shapes paths of accumulation within the domestic economy in Tanzania. In concluding, it argues that the fragmented distribution of power within the ruling party means that policy responses of the donor community, in particular the halting of aid disbursements, have been ineffective and are likely to continue to be ineffective in stopping grand corruption in Tanzania.

This article is published at an interesting of Tanzania's political history. It presents four cases of grand corruption: (a) the BAE 'civil aviation radar system' case, (b) the Richmond and IPTL case, (c) the IPTL 'Escrow' case, and (d) the EPA case

Here are some of the interesting messages that I take from the article:

1. "The article argues that this distribution of power within the elite means that it is difficult for the president, or any group within the ruling party, to stop grand corruption." (p. 4). "....the central leadership is often unable to clamp down on corruption within the ruling party and, as in Tanzania, the ruling party does not exhibit the capacity for centralized control of corruption" (p. 20).

2. "Even under the threat of donor withdrawal of aid, the ability of the ruling CCM party to constrain corruption effectively is undermined by the fragmented distribution of power within the ruling party." (p. 5). "....different factions within the ruling party hold equal weight and neither the president nor any particular faction is able to dominate within these elite struggles" (p. 20).

3. In Tanzania, most of "off-budget" expenditures - the known-unknowns of public finance - include "funds to the State House and to the army........" "While not officially part of the public expenditures of the state, the high degree of political influence over these institutions meant that such expenditure can, in effect, be considered a form of state expenditure."(p. 6)

4. The structural and procedural reforms in public financial management in the 2000s did little to reduce the grand corruption, contrary to how the reforms effectively addressed petty corruption.

5. The grand corruption has increasingly been exposed due to: rising influence of more plural and vocal media; and, openness and critical discussions through the Parliament, with active engagement of CHADEMA and from within CCM's own ranks.

6. The growing inequality and socio-economic differentiation as a result of neoliberal economic philosophies, is likely to shake the currently 'stable' political dynamics that sustain CCM.

7. The egalitarian economic structures during Ujamaa era made Tanzanian Asian business community economically powerful as they dominate larger proportion of economic activities. The economic power of the Asian business community made it easier for the community to access the formal political power. This manifests in the involvement of the Asian business community in the 2000s grand corruption cases.

8. Building on Marx's thesis on 'primitive accumulation', the author argues that grand corruption can influence the overall pace and character of economic development, if the money generated is used to fund local investments. However, it isn't the case in Tanzania as "corrupt forms of accumulation associated with these scandals mainly resulted in capital flight" (p. 19).

9. The author concludes that:

(a) the donor community's policy responses (e.g. the recent cessation of aid disbursements) to grand grand corruption are likely to continue being ineffective in addressing the problem, as such responses don't take into the account ongoing political-economic complexities within the Tanzania's political sphere, and in particular the ruling party.

(b) new socio-political forces that challenge the existing 'status quo' [distribution of power] are emerging and manifesting through protests over: "land rights, religious grievances, payments of public sector workers, and student loans" (p. 22). These forces and resulting power redistribution may "constrain grand corruption, at least in the short term" (Ibid).

Why didn't CCM lose?

Just before the General Elections in Tanzania on 25 October 2015,  Mathew Bukhi wrote the reflections below on an article - and email - entitled 'Why the CCM won't lose: the roots of single-party dominance in Tanzania':

I found one journal article, with a title similar to this email's subject, very interesting and timely.

The author, Melanie O’Gorman, is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Winnipeg in Canada. Her research is in the areas of economic development, education and macroeconomics, and she has done fieldwork in Pakistan and Tanzania.
In the paper, Melanie provides an empirical investigation of the factors contributing to single-party dominance in Tanzania. She discusses the dominant reasons for CCM support, as well as the characteristics of farmers who are more likely to support an opposition party. She provides the analysis and arguments based on farmers’ perspectives of politics and CCM’s dominance. She concludes by providing possible policy options for enhance political competition in Tanzania. 
In the introduction part: she provides some conceptual background to her main argument. She links the progress of democratisation and economic liberalisation of the 1980s; where most commentators were envisioning competitive political landscape in Tanzania after the reforms. She then writes on her methods, showing how she undertook qualitative and quantitative analyses of voting behaviours amongst farmers in Tanzania. “The qualitative analysis reveals a sense of nostalgia for the CCM, gratitude for the CCM s maintenance of peace, satisfaction with the CCM s performance during one-party rule and a sense that the CCM is the party that identifies the most with farmers’ concerns”.
Her empirical analysis shows that “access to newspapers or radio make a farmer more likely to support an opposition party”; and farmers are more likely to oppose the CCM the lower their subsistence consumption, or the higher the value of their capital equipment. She also argues “the majority of rural citizens in Tanzania are loyal to the dominant Tanzanian party, in the absence of any material benefits stemming from that loyalty”.
The broader goal of her article was to explore the puzzle of rural neglect in Tanzania. Whereby, the rural neglect manifests itself in forms of: relatively poor public services when compared to urban areas; and “relatively lack of budgetary support for the agricultural sector”. She was therefore interested to identify “reasons behind rural support for the CCM amid rural neglect, and therefore sheds light on factors contributing to a lack of responsiveness to the rural sector on the part of the Tanzanian government”.
What captured me the most in her part is two tables – table 6 and 7 – which present reasons for CCM and opposition support respectively.  In the table number 6, Melanie illustrates the top reasons for CCM support, which are:  they performed well during one-party rule, they are the only strong party, they have maintained peace, they identify with farmers and they brought us independence”. And then she provides six hypotheses that she tested to build her argument. For table number 7, she argues that reasons for opposition support “were mainly based on practical rather than ideological grounds”.  For example, half of those supporting an opposition party cited a reason related to rural neglect – that the opposition party they support was concerned with poverty, development or farmers’ concerns. Other reasons put forward suggest that there is confidence in the abilities of opposition parties – farmers thought such parties are strong, have good policies and could provide a stable economy. 
In her conclusion, she claims, “while many rural Tanzanians are indeed shouldering the burden of economic reforms, such a burden is not straining their loyalty to the party enacting the reforms. A lack of a strong alternative among the political parties seems to be a prime reason for this loyalty, as does a sense of nostalgia for the party which brought them independence and which has maintained relative peace”. She says with such loyalty, CCM takes the rural neglect for granted knowing that it has strong support from rural people [mostly farmers]. Melanie claims this is due to the fact that farmers’ support to CCM is “ideological factors – an inherent loyalty or nostalgia for a party that helped to bring independence to the country, which has maintained peace, and which historically supported farmers”.

Why should Tanzanians pay taxes?

Mathew Bhuki's Reflections on 'The Tax Question':

Here is the latest Tanzania's economic update from the World Bank.

This seventh economic update goes to the heart of one of the main challenges faced by Tanzania: how can the country finance its development? This is a fundamental question when aid is coming down as a proportion of a growing GDP, and as access to financial markets remains limited. One option would be to rely more on the private sector to deliver education, health, roads, ports and electricity. This is possible as demonstrated by many such experiences around the world, and therefore this approach needs to be one important part of the solution to finance development. The argument presented in this economic update is that higher tax revenues will come only if a comprehensive approach is adopted. The tax system has to be affordable, fair, simple, and transparent. The government also has to be accountable for the money it is receiving. It is only when these basic conditions are met that tax compliance will increase. Because a strong social contract between the State and its citizens is not yet sufficiently in place in Tanzania, a number of suggestions are proposed in the update, with the objective of stimulating debate on possible approaches to increase tax revenue.

I find part II of the report very interesting. It asks a question: why should Tanzanians pay more taxes? Here are some highlights:

Tanzania currently collects approximately USD 6 billion in tax revenues per year, a figure equivalent to around 12 percent of its GDP. This covers approximately three quarters of the Government’s expenses. This is insufficient, particularly when other sources of funding, such as foreign inflows, are declining, or limited, such as borrowing and private sector finance. Put simply, Tanzania must collect more taxes.

Tanzania’s tax system relies on a combination of VAT, income tax, import duties and excise tax. Reliance on these four main taxes is not unusual in low-income countries. However, Tanzania’s performance in the area of the collection of VAT is one of the worst in the world.

The low VAT contribution in Tanzania is also unusual compare to other low-income countries.

The Tanzanian tax system might be the worst of two worlds: on the one hand, taxes are theoretically quite high, which discourages taxpayers from paying. On the other hand, weak collection efforts result in a failure of the State to collect the taxes it needs.

Thus, Tanzania, like other low-income countries, must intensify its tax revenue collection effortsTax collection performance is obviously linked to prosperity, with a strong correlation between tax revenues and GDP per capita…… A recent survey indicates that many Tanzanians are reluctant to pay taxes because they see them as burdensome, unfair and lacking in transparency. 

To meet these three challenges, Tanzania will need to implement bold and innovative actions that go beyond the traditional administrative measures:

1. The system must be affordable: The actual cost of paying taxes is higher than on paper as demonstrated by Tanzania’s poor ranking in the “ease of paying taxes” indicator in the World Bank’s Doing Business survey. Here, the solution is to simplify the system. Tanzania should streamline the numerous small taxes, which impose a high burden on businesses without corresponding gains to government revenues. The Government must also reduce the use of tax exemptions. The explosion in the use of mobile devices represents a great opportunity for tax authorities to use accessible, cost-effective systems for taxpayers to make payments.

2. The system must be perceived as fair: In particular, it is necessary to broaden the tax base. In Tanzania, close to 90 percent of tax revenues are generated by Dar-es-Salaam, yet the city contributes to less than 20 percent of the national GDP. Almost half of Tanzanian VAT revenues on domestic transactions are collected from three sectors (telecommunications, beverages, and cigarettes). There is a huge imbalance between the taxation on labor and capital income. Tax collection should be diversified to under-taxed sectors and regions….. Similarly, public recognition of high taxpayers can also incentivize payment. Of course, stronger and effective sanctions against tax evaders are also vitally necessary.

3. The system must be transparent: The Government needs to publish comprehensive, accessible reports on its tax collection efforts. In this area, the private sector can play a role. Some major telecom companies in Tanzania have announced that they will voluntarily publish full details of their tax payments. Such a level of transparency should be mandatory for all public enterprises and agencies.

The implementation of these actions may test the Government’s political commitment. Without doubt, if the measures described above are implemented appropriately, there will be winners and losers. While these actions will provide gains for Tanzania as a whole, those gains may occur to the detriment of politically powerful vested interests. This may make implementation politically challenging.

Read the whole report here: 

Thursday, October 29, 2015

Is Magufuli Tanzania's Buhari?

At last the National Electoral Commission (NEC) has declared Dr. John Magufuli the President-Elect of Tanzania. During the campaigns Emmanuel Tayari asserted that his main opponent in the General Elections,  Edward Lowassa is not Tanzania’s Buhari. Now Udadisi is asking whether Magufuli is - or rather will be - indeed Tanzania's Buhari in relation to what it has asserted as what ought to be the first task of the coming/new President i.e 'The Youth Question'. In doing so, it is suggesting that we subsitute Buhari's name with that of Magufuli in the submission below from Samuel Zalanga (used by permission):

For me, in order to understand a politician or what he or she said, I start by looking at the broader social context, the broad structure of state and society, and then situate the politician or what was said within it. This leads me to the conclusion that what politicians say can only be understood in the context of the broader society.

It is not just Buhari but whoever assumes power in Nigeria will have to deal with chronic and long term decadence in governance. I do not say this out of disrespect but this is the fact for anyone who invest serious interest in how things happen in Nigeria. 

There are many people in Nigeria who will criticize Buhari on something that on the surface appears legitimate but the reality is that there is an elite in Nigeria that is used to doing what it likes at the local government, state and federal level without accountability. For them, government position is like a fiefdom. They have no concept of fiduciary responsibility

No serious observer will say that Buhari can solve all Nigeria's problem. I do not think even Buhari and his Vice President will say that. But they can initiate some serious changes and hopefully there will be a trend in that direction. In order for him and his Vice President to succeed, they will need the support of everyone. But it would not be an easy task. Many cheaply enriched themselves under GEJ [Goodluck Ebele Jonathan] and sometimes you just wonder whether there was even a government in Nigeria that realized that the Nigerian population is over 150 million people. This corruption was in all regions, all ethnic groups and all religious groups. It was an equal opportunity affair.

If I am correct in my analysis, your approach is just to listen to what a politician says and treat the words like magic and assume that without paying attention to the deep structure and underlying social realities of the society, what was said can just be taken on its face value. Thinking that way, you assume that Buhari or anyone for that matter can just bring about total change. There are problems that ought to be pointed out but just reading what many people posted on this listserv, it is obvious that the new administration has compelled some people to sit up straight.

I spent this weekend reading this book:
It is amazing to read the situation of the youth in Africa. One warning I see there is that without serious and sustained reform in Nigeria, the yearnings of the youth is going to be a time-bomb. I remember worshiping in one church in Jos, and virtually 70% of the congregation were less than 30 years in age. I immediately asked, what is the country planning for them. And some policy documents in Nigeria treat the youth as a liability. We need to hurry up otherwise the situation will explode one day. Please note that given the structure of Nigerian constitution, governors have a lot of freedom in shaping the direction of public policy. I hope you will broaden your interest beyond Buhari. I know he is the president but he can only go so far.

Unlike you, I do not expect a miracle. Some may disagree with Bishop Kukah but I think he is right in telling Nigerians that they should not expect Buhari to solve all of Nigeria's problems. It still gives me concern that some people are expecting a political Messiah. Buhari by and large won because of the great disappointment that many had with the previous administration. With excellent record, it would have been impossible, no matter what for Buhari to win. The elites in Abuja just took ordinary Nigerians for granted. We are just a means to their ends and not seen as ends in ourselves. I will have no problem if APC fails the Nigerian people, and another party takes over.

In so far as our methodological approaches differ, we will see this kind of differences over and over. It is interesting that the author of the book I am reading accounts for the behavior of the youth in Africa not by focusing on the behavior per se, but by primarily situating the behavior within the context of changes in the economy and society over a long period of time. The social changes have impacted the younger generation in different ways compared to the older generation, and the social changes force them to adopt certain coping strategies. Some people just focus on the behavior of the youth while ignoring the underlying causes. Situation matters very much in explaining human behavior and choices.

Is the National Electoral Commission credible?

Is the Tanzanian National Electoral Commission (NEC) credible?

"There is a grey area between incompetency and conspiracy" - Election Observer

By Chambi Chachage

If a palm wine tapper is praised, he/she dilutes it with water. This Swahili proverb captures what has been happening in the aftermath of Tanzania’s General Elections that seemed to be held freely and fairly on Sunday, 25 October 2015. No sooner had the local and international observers hailed the National Electoral Commission (NEC) than the political parties started lodging complaints about irregularities and/or rigging.

Headed by a retired judge, Damian Lubuva, NEC has been sluggish in announcing the results. As Elsie Eyakuze aptly noted a day after the voting, one could hardly comprehend how, in this day and age, we could be down to one man reading from a spreadsheet. To make matters worse, the initial focus seemed to be more on announcing results from the constituencies that the ruling party – CCM – was leading.
 As such, conspiracy theories abound. The presidential candidate of the main opposition party, CHADEMA, has publicly claimed that the delay tactic is NEC’s gimmick geared towards preparing people ‘psychologically’ to just accept defeat no matter how unjust. By people, it seems, he is referring to supporters of a coalition of four opposition parties known as UKAWA that endorsed him as their sole candidate.

Hoseana Lunogelo, however, views it positively: “I think it is a commendable strategy to ‘manage expectations’ from the youthful voters supporting Ukawa who were promised that ‘Ukawa will be the outright winner before noon on election day.’” So, he insists, “by showing them that they are trailing from the start is part of a clever strategy to diffuse tension otherwise we could have seen streets already full of youth celebrating victory even when less than a quarter of the votes have been counted.”

While we have been watching what Elsie Eyakuze refers to as a public institution fighting an uphill battle over the legitimacy of results, CCM’s machinery has been churning out projected results so efficiently. How come, one wonders, the ruling party seems so well equipped than NEC? And why is CHADEMA ‘inept’ this time around?

The answer, it seems, is twofold. First, CCM’s tech-savvy ‘spokesperson’ – January Makamba – who also happens to be the Government’s Deputy Minister of Communication, Science and Technology has marshaled an Obama-like machinery of campaign and information bombardment. For instance, I had never subscribed to CCM’s listserv but both my yahoo addresses have been receiving ‘his/its’ statements. 

At the end of each statement there are these words: “You received this email as part of our network. Click here to UNSUBSCRIBE.” Tellingly, the statement that January Makamba sent a day after the voting had a section that translates to “CCM’s Results” whereby he claimed that, according to the results that were posted on voting booths, up to that point CCM had won 176 out 264 seats in the regions their party had tallied.

Probably aware that it would be so problematic to also give their projected figures for CCM’s presidential candidate, he shrewdly stated that the parliamentary trend was in tandem with NEC’s then ongoing announcement of presidential votes. In other words, January Makamba was simply saying their candidate was ‘winning big’. On twitter he did not restrain himself that much when he tweeted, on 25 October 2015, that on 29 October 2015 CCM’s candidate ‘would/will’ be announced as “The President Elect.”

Expectedly, the tweet triggered a furor, leading the co-founder of an opposition party known as ACT, Kitila Mkumbo to thus tweet on the same day: “I have also asked ‪@JMakamba to exercise restraint.” Understandably, the deputy minister responsible for communication thus kept going on the ‘defensive’: “For [a] party to say it will win is allowed (all parties been saying that since Aug). Announcing tallies not allowed.” 

Meanwhile – and this is the second reason for the contrast between NEC, CCM and CHADEMA – UKAWA’s machinery staggered, apparently, because the police captured its tech-team that includes one respected young Tanzanian activist, Frederick Fussi. The contentious matter is in the courts hence beyond the scope of this analysis.

One thus finds it ironic that now even CCM seems to be complaining about NEC. In its latest statement dated 28 October 2015, January Makamba claims that those in charge of the following constituencies that they lost ‘messed up’ the elections: Iringa Mjini, Mikumi, Ndanda and Kawe. Some folks in WhatsApp groups, which have proved to be a main online site of campaigns and contestations over the elections, claim that this is a ploy, by the ruling party, to play the game of the opposition party.
In such a setup, NEC is indeed facing an uphill task to safeguard its credibility. But for many a critic, it lost its legitimacy long time ago when the constitutional reform process that could have led to an independent electoral commission process faltered. It is also ironic that UKAWA, as self-proclaimed movement for the ‘Constitution of the People’, was a product – indeed a byproduct – of the faltering that favoured CCM.

No matter how just NEC’s current chair and new director of elections were, they are new wines in an old bottle. The wine taper may have not diluted it. But who can really tell?

Monday, October 26, 2015

Jukumu la Kwanza la Rais Ajaye

Jukumu la Kwanza la Rais Ajaye

Chambi Chachage

Uchaguzi wa Rais wa Tano wa Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania ulioanza jana tarehe 25 Oktoba 2015 sasa unafikia tamati. Tume ya Uchaguzi imeshaanza kutangaza baadhi ya matokeo. Wafuatiliaji wameshaanza kuona mwelekeo wa nani atakuwa Rais Mteule.

Rais huyo ajaye hakika atakuwa na vipaumbele vyake kichwani. Vipo vitakavyotokana na Ilani ya chama chake. Lakini tunaamini vipo ambavyo angalau vitatokana na maono yake ya uongozi.

Kama raia wa nchi hii nami nina maono yangu ninayotamani yaendane na ya Rais Mtarajiwa. Naamini jukumu la kwanza la Rais huyo linapaswa kuwa ni jibu kwa vijana waliochoka na hali ilivyo.

Baada ya kupiga kura, Jumapili jioni nilibahatika kutembelea vituo kadhaa Jijini Dar es Salaam nikiongozana na baadhi ya marafiki zangu ambao wana matumaini sana kwamba kama Mgombea wa Chama Tawala atashinda basi atalete mabadiliko makubwa, siyo kwenye Serikali tu bali pia katika chama. Hali tuliyoikuta vituoni ilituacha tukijiuliza maswali mengi kuhusu vijana hasa wa mijini.

Katika kituo kimojawapo kijana mmoja aliponiona tu (na nahisi) kupima kuwa mimi ni kijana mwenzake ukilinganisha na wenzangu akanisalimia: "Kijana, Mambo Mazuri!" Alichokuwa anamaanisha tuliweza kukiona katika vituo vya eneo hilo ambalo Mgombea wa Chama Tawala alipata kura chache ukilinganisha na yule Mgombea nguli aliyewahi kudai kuwa vijana ni 'Bomu linalosubiri Kulipuka'.

Swali kubwa ambalo limepelekea niandike makala haya na ambalo naamini ndilo hasa (linalopaswa kuwa) jukumu la kwanza la Rais Mteule ni: Je, ni namna gani Serikali ya Awamu ya Tano itarudisha (kwa maneno na vitendo) imani na matumaini ya vijana - hasa wa mijini - waliokatishwa tamaa na mfumo wa utawala wa nchi hii? 

Jibu la swali hili ni la kiuchumi na kiusalama. Ili vijana hao waone Serikali yao inafanya kitu lazima waone uchumi wenye ajira ukikua na siyo huu tulionao ambao wachumi kadhaa wanauita 'uchumi usio na ajira'. Na usalama wa nchi utategemea sana hili la vijana kuishi katika nchi ambayo ina uchumi unaokua huku ukileta ajira.

Ndiyo maana nakubaliana kabisa na mmoja wa marafiki zangu tuliokuwa nao vituoni hiyo jana ambaye anaamini kuwa ukuaji wa viwanda utasaidia suala hilo la uchumi na anayeamini kuwa suala hilo - na la usalama - linatakiwa kuwa kipaumbele cha Rais ajaye.

Lakini viwanda hivi vinapaswa kuzingatia uhusiano kati ya miji na vijiji pamoja na miji na majiji. Kama vijana wengi wamejazana mijini kutokana na sekta ya kilimo kutokuwa na tija basi ni heri viwanda vyenye mahusiano na kilimo vikajengwa katika namna ambayo vitaifanya miji mikubwa kama Dar es Salaam ambayo ina idadi kubwa sana ya vijana kupumua na kutoa nafasi kwa mingine.

Viwanda visijikite Dar es Salaam tu. Bali na Tanga, Mtwara na kwingineko. Ifike mahali kijana wa Kisosora asione ni lazima aje Kinondoni na 'kubanana hapa hapa' jijini tu ili aweze kuendelea. 

Pia tukumbuke kuwa watafiti mbalimbali - toka enzi za Profesa Justinian Rweyemamu - wametafiti sana suala la viwanda nchini Tanzania. Hivyo, ni vyema kuyarejea makabrasha na mapendekezo yao mengi ambayo mengine bado yana 'mashiko' hata hivi leo. 

Japokuwa nimehoji ni Ilani ya Chama gani inatumika kuandaa Mpango wa Maendeleo wa Miaka Mitano (2016/2017-2020/2021) utakaojikita katika 'Uchumi wa Viwanda' nchini Tanzania ambao tayari ulianza kuandaliwa hata kabla ya Uchaguzi huu wa mwaka 2015, naamini ni muhimu mchakato huo ukazingatia sana madai ya vijana wengi waliopiga kura zinazosemekana kuwa ni za 'hasira'.

Katika dunia ya teknolojia, unaweza kuzalisha viwanda vingi lakini vikazidi tu kujenga jamii yenye matabaka ya 'wavuja jasho' na 'wavuna jasho'. Kama viwanda havitazalisha ajira za 'kutosha' na zenye ujira wa 'kiheshima' basi Rais ajaye atakuwa anaendelea tu kuchochea kemikali za moto kwenye hilo bomu tulilotishiwa kuwa linasubiri tu kulipuka. Hivyo, wataalamu wetu wa viwanda - kina Profesa Samuel Wangwe na Dakta Blandina Kilama wa REPOA - wanaoshirikiana na Tume ya Mipango katika Ofisi ya Rais kuandaa huo Mpango wa Maendeleo wasisahau makabrasha yao ya zamani yaliyozingatia nafasi ya ajira na ujira katika mapinduzi ya viwanda.

Lakini viwanda siyo mwarubaini au mugyariga wa Babu wa Loliondo. Hauwezi kuponya kila tatizo letu nchini. Kuna njia nyingine nyingi tu za kujibu hilo 'Suala' na 'Swali la Vijana.' Wapo wanaotumia ujasiriamali. Hilo nalo lina utata na utete wake lakini ni muhimu sana hasa katika nchi ambayo haijaweza kikamilifu kutekeleza Sera ya Mgombea mmojawapo wa Urais iliyojikita katika kaulimbiu tamu ya 'Elimu, Elimu, Elimu' mpaka kupelekea 'wanailm' kudai tulichonacho ni 'Bora Elimu' na siyo 'Elimu Bora'.

Vijana wengi wana uwezo/akili. Lakini wengi hawakuchaguliwa kuendelea na 'Elimu ya Juu' n.k. Na kama Mwalimu Nyerere alivyosisitiza, siyo wote waliofeli - hawakuchaguliwa tu kwa kuwa hakukuwa na nafasi za kutosha. Na wengine hawakuweza 'kufaulu' kutokana tu na sababu za kijamii/kifamilia na kiuchumi/kifedha.

Hadi leo nakumbuka tukio moja lililonitokea enzi zangu za 'utoro' nilipokuwa mwanafunzi katika Shule ya Msingi Mlimani. Wakati wa likizo nilienda Gonja Maore, kijijini kwa Bibi yangu Mkunde Kitunga, ambapo kulikuwa na shule ambayo ilikuwa haijawahi 'kufaulisha' mwanafunzi yeyote toka enzi za Mama yangu Demere na nduguze. Basi kukatokea ubishani mkubwa sana kati yangu na watoto wa kijijini hapo kuhusu ubora wa shule zao na zetu za mijini. Nikajitapa na kujitapa kwa vigezo vya 'ufaulu' wetu n.k.

Mtoto mmoja akainama na kuchora maumbo kadhaa kwenye mchanga. Akaniambia tafuta basi 'mzingo'. Kilichofuata ni mimi 'kupotezea' kwa kuwa, kiukweli, sikuwa najua namna ya kuzifanya hizo Hesabu. Mtoto akalalama "hawa watoto wa mjini wanaringa tu kwa kuwa wana hali nzuri lakini hawajatuzidi maarifa". Pamoja na hayo nilifaulu Darasa la 7 na kwenda shule ya Sekondari Azania.

Mwenzangu hakufaulu kwa kuwa hakukuwa na shule ya sekondari hata ya Kata hapo kijijini. Za wilaya na mkoa zilikuwepo ila ndizo hilo walizokuwa wanashindania kuzipata na sisi watoto wa mjini. 

Kha, leo eti mimi ndiye nipo kwenye Chuo Kikuu maarufu duniani! Je, najua mwenzangu ambaye labda anastahili kuliko mimi kuwa hapo yuko wapi leo? Hata sijui. Lakini kuna uwezekano mkubwa kuwa ni miongoni mwa vijana wanaotaka mabadiliko kwa 'udi na uvumba', yaani kwa namna yoyote ile hata kwa kutumia 'daraja' la 'ufisadi'! Hawa ndiyo vijana ambao Rais ajaye anapaswa kuwajibu ni kwa nini pamoja na uwezo walionao na rasilimali tulizonazo, wagombanie tu kuchuuza karanga na kashata kwenye vituo vya mabasi n.k. ilhali wanaweza kufanya shughuli zenye tija zaidi?

Rafiki yangu mmoja sasa anafanya utafiti ambao umeonesha, kwa kufanya 'jaribio' halisi kabisa, kwamba hata  baadhi ya vijana ambao hawakufanya vizuri kwenye mtihani wa Taifa wa Kidato cha Nne wakipewa mafunzo kidogo ya ujasiriamali na mtaji mdogo tu wanaweza kufanya biashara zenye tija na wengine hata kuweza kuajiri wenzao. Badala ya kijana kukaa nyumbani au mtaani akiwa hana matumaini kisa eti 'amefeli' kumbe anaweza 'kuwezeshwa' na 'akaweza' kufanya kitu chenye tija kwa kwa familia na Taifa lao.

Ni kweli siyo vijana wote wanaweza kuwa wajasiriamali. Pia ni kweli siyo vijana wote wanaweza kufanya kazi viwandani. Ila ni muhimu kuwa na namna ya kuwaandaa vijana waweze kufanya kile wanachokiweza na, zaidi ya yote, kile wanachokipenda maishani.

Isitoshe ukikipenda kitu ni rahisi kukimudu. Na ukikimudu ni rahisi kuwa mchapakazi. Kama kweli Tanzania ya mwaka 2015-2020 ya Rais ajaye itakuwa ni ya "Hapa Kazi Tu" basi wafanyakazi hao, hasa vijana wetu, wanapaswa kwanza kuwa na kazi za kufanya.

Viwandani na mashambani. Dukani na sokoni. Mijini na vijijini. 

Karibu kwenye ulingo wa kutafakari kuhusu tunapotoka,tulipo,tuendako na namna ambavyo tutafika huko tuendako/Welcome to a platform for reflecting on where we are coming from, where we are, where we are going and how we will get there

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