Friday, December 29, 2017

Uzinduzi wa Kampeni kuhusu Sonono (Depression)

Tuesday, December 19, 2017

Public Lecture: Tariq Ali on Africa's 2nd Liberation

Mhadhara wa 4 wa Nyerere/Dialogue Lecture IV

Wednesday, December 13, 2017

The Gory and Glorious History of Gorée Island

The Gory and Glorious History of Gorée Island

Chambi Chachage

"Africa will write its own history and in both north and south it will be a history of glory and dignity" - Patrice Lumumba

It was both distressing and soothing to read Takura Zhangazha and Paul Shalala's reflections on our recent trip to Gorée Island in Senegal. Distressing because of the constant reminder about the gory legacy of slavery. Soothing because of their optimism about the glorious outcomes of the enduring struggles from enslavement.

The island, as Shalala keenly observes, is a reminder of "how fragile human life can be when those in authority do not respect the rights of those they lead." And, as Zhangazha aptly puts it regarding such visits,  "there was always going to be a significant pause for thought, pained emotion and a sense of liberation."

One such moment came when I stumbled on an inscription of Michel Adanson. He is described as a student of two naturalists who "left in 1749 for Senegal to spend four years as an employee with the 'Campagnie des Indes', a trading company." This is none other than the French East India Company that was instrumental in the 'birth' of capitalism and the slavery that fed its (initial) 'rise'.
His inscription caught my eyes because I had just completed a dissertation chapter on the history of capitalism in Africa that draws from Mary Louise Pratt's critique of naturalists. She argues that their collective works and debates contributed to the birth of 'scientific' racism. It is this 'Linnaean Watershed', a term for the historical period derived from the name of a leading naturalist, Carl Linnaeus, that led to a fusion of racism, capitalism and colonialism.

Critics of Pratt may wish to note that her core argument is not that naturalists had to agree with Linnaeus to be part of the watershed. One only had to be part of the collective discourse of classifying people and plants hierarchically. A reference source indicates that Adanson even "presented Linnaeus with a number of plants from his collection before the break in relations over their competing systems of classification." No wonder they became rivals. Yet, as the inscription above notes, Linnaeus named the baobab that continues to grace Gorée Island today "Adansonia digitata". 
Although one writer asserts that Adanson "entered the service 
of the French East India Company in order to study the natural history of Senegambia", it must have dawned to him that he had to also be an accomplice in slavery and racism. However, another writer indicates that he "formed the project of a settlement on the African coast for raising colonial produce without negro slavery, which the French East India company refused to encourage." 

 One sympathetic writer is critical enough to quote Michele Duchet who "stresses that Adanson’s voyage to Senegal had more than a scientific purpose" as "they are fact-finding missions in the broadest sense of the term" whereby the "result of his travels is not only the natural history of Senegal, but also secret memoirs under the direction officialdom, to be found side by side with archives of other colonial administrative memoirs, as elements of the same dossier." This writer who happens to be Xavier Carteret then cites this evidence from André Bailly that captures his colonial ideals:

Yet Carteret's sympathetic reading reiterates this query: "What, in Adanson’s mind, were 'free and voluntary slave[s]?'" Citing Jean-Paul Nicolas, Carteret then sharply observes that the "oxymoron stops us from seeing clearly, but another note scribbled in the same copy of the Encyclopédie is close to asserting an antislavery position. Adanson proposes to replace 'slaves by deported criminals who bear a plaque stating the nature of their crimes, to be chained and to work in this hot country instead of black slaves.'"

For Carteret, the director of the French East India Company rejected Adanson's proposal because their business "was, one suspects, strongly attached to black slavery." One of the proof for this, he argues, is "the abuses of which the naturalist complained during his long stay." This story leads him to distance the naturalist from the history of slavery. "While Adanson is silent on the issue of the slave trade on his voyage to Senegal—without doubt for strategic reasons concerning publication", Carteret thus argues, "he shows himself immediately to be hostile to any form of racism."

Strategic silence? For the sake of what? At the expense of who?
Pragmatic silence in the name of advancing 'scientific' knowledge can have a detrimental effect on humanity. Adanson may seem far removed from our contemporary history. But the dilemmas he faced and the choices he made were more or less the same as the ones we are encountering in our situation today with its modern slavery.

Zhangazha whom we started with reminds us that knowing "too that there are still contemporary actors that want to pursue this trade in Libya (and elsewhere) means the struggle against slavery is not over." And Shalala who followed insists that we should move from "slavery to the promotion of reconciliation" and "peace."  Or, in other words, from the gory to the glorious history of Africa(ns).
Jacques Depelchin may also add that, in both cases, 'Silences in African History' is not option for, as Lumumba foretold during his imprisonment, the "day will come when history will speak." 

Thursday, December 7, 2017

Hongera Sana Dakta Jacqueline Halima Mgumia!

Friday, December 1, 2017

Herufi M: Namwogopa Mnangagwa Kuliko Mugabe

Namwogopa Mnangagwa Kuliko Mugabe

Chambi Chachage

Sijui kama kuna ukweli wowote kuwa kama jina lako la ukoo linaanziwa na herufi 'M' basi kuna uwezekano mkubwa wa kuwa Rais. Lakini ninapotazama ramani ya Afrika naona kumekuwa na Marais wengi wenye aina hiyo ya majina: Mandela, Mbeki, Mwinyi, Mkapa, Magufuli. Lakini lao nataka kuongelea Marais wawili waliopokezana vijiti kwa mbinde: Mugabe na Mnangagwa.

Hawa walikuwa Makamaradi. Nasikia eti  bado ni Makomredi. Walipigana pamoja kwenye vita vya ukombozi vya Chimurenga ya Pili. Pia walishirikiana katika mauaji ya kimbari ya Gukurahundi.

Ndiyo maana halikuwa jambo la ajabu pale ambapo mmoja wao alipoonekana kama mrithi wa mwenzake katika kiti cha Urais. Lakini kutokana na mazingira ya kutatanisha, urithi huo ilibidi upatikane kwa mapinduzi ya kijeshi ya aina yake. Mapinduzi hewa.

Leo mrithi huyo ajulikanaye kwa jina la utani la Mamba ambalo nalo linaanza na herufi 'M' ameripotiwa kuwa ameteua Mawaziri wakiwamo Makomredi wale wale wa Chimurenga na Gukurahundi. Hili linanikumbusha uchambuzi huu wa majuzi wa Profesa nguli:

Japo sitaki kumnanga mtu, napotafakari tunapoelekea kisiasa nadiriki kusema namwogopa sana Mnangagwa kuliko Mugabe. 

Friday, November 24, 2017

How Much Transparency in Fighting Corruption?

How Much Transparency is Needed in Fighting Corruption?

Dastan Kweka 

Twaweza released another installment of `Sauti za Wananchi` findings this week - this time focusing on corruption. What stands out is that citizens “report experiencing less corruption in their regular interactions with government (and other) institutions”, compared to 2014. This is happening after multiple incidents of newspapers suspension, and recent withdrawal from Open Government Partnership (OGP) - all seen as continuation of efforts to restrict civic space. Notably, withdrawal from OGP caused uproar, and many wondered how a government committed to fighting corruption would decide to distance itself from an initiative meant to achieve the same objective. This piece explores the thinking that seem to guide the fifth phase government's conception of accountability, and which may be informing its approach in the fight against corruption. 

In the brief that summarizes the findings, Twaweza notes that the fifth phase government has “brought a new approach” to fighting corruption, and mentions the establishment of anti-corruption court, and swift action in response to allegations of corruption as examples. Moreover, the brief notes that the (new) approach has attracted both “praise and criticism”. On criticism, the brief states;

“However, critics point to the lack of respect for (due) process and the rights of the accused, and to the apparent amnesty being given to former presidents for any involvement they may have had in past scandals. Further, the government is also doing other things that are likely to weaken anti-corruption efforts in the long term such as reducing space for media and public debate and removing Tanzania from the Open Government Partnership.”
The excerpt above suggests that transparency, and guaranteeing space for public debate, are key in fighting corruption. This is a conventional view. Evidence shows that transparency per se isn't sufficient. The fourth phase government, under President Kikwete, took significant steps to enhance transparency, as symbolized by the adoption of Open Government Partnership (OGP) as well as Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Other transparency (and accountability!) initiatives included African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), Construction Sector Transparency Initiative (CoST) and even Publish What You Pay (PWYP). Government support for these initiatives was predicated on the belief that transparency was key in enhancing accountability. 

However, in spite of such multiple initiatives, accountability remained low. In terms of corruption, for instance, Transparency International`s corruption perception index rating for Tanzania remained almost stagnant - hovering around 30 to 35 (100 is not corrupt), between 2012 and 2015. In this period, Tanzania failed to improve its scores on the index “by a statistically significant amount.” Perhaps the irony of the limits of transparency in delivering accountability was well captured in Policy Forums Governance Review report (2012), which was titled `Transparency with Impunity`?

Corruption is an accountability issue. Scholars of accountability have differentiated between two dominant forms - horizontal, and vertical accountability. Horizontal accountability refers to the “capacity of state institutions to check abuses by other public agencies and branches of the government, or the requirement for agencies to report sideways.” Parliament and Judiciary are key institutions in this category, and are envisaged to work in a manner that checks the executive. However, vertical accountability is “the means through which citizens, mass media and civil society seeks to enforce standards of good performance on officials.” Actors under this form of accountability rely on public disclosures to be able to influence change. This explains the essence of Twaweza`s concern over space for media and country`s withdrawal from Open Government Partnership.
The current regime's approach to accountability, including the fight against corruption, seems to focus on enhancing horizontal accountability, while curtailing its vertical variant. This is, in part, due to the current regimes need to build its own power base, and a (historical) weak link between transparency and accountability. Vertical accountability depends  on the capacity of civil society to network, organize and influence public opinion. This is difficult in the context characterized by low public awareness, even of major corruption cases, as Twaweza has shown in its brief. Moreover, while the parliament, under the fourth phase government, led the demand for accountability (bunge lenye meno), the current fight is being led by the executive. The (executive) push for horizontal form of accountability is in line with the regime`s illiberal tendencies, which are made possible by the current constitution.

Effective and sustainable anti-corruption initiatives require a convergence of horizontal and vertical accountability efforts. But, as Tanzania`s experience has shown, when the horizontal `arm` is weak, the vertical can do little to bring about change. Therefore, if one had to make some concessions, it would be worth compromising on the latter, especially when things seem to work.

Sunday, November 5, 2017

How bad is President Magufuli's Populism?

How Bad is President Magufuli's Populism?

Dastan  Kweka

Many journalists and analysts have ascribed a populism label to President Magufuli's actions - or inactions, over the last two years. However, few have bothered to define the concept, and often, commentators have written from a negative point of view. But, is populism always bad?

Nic Cheeseman is notable for having written a thought-provoking piece about Magufuli's populism, in which he alluded to his conception of the term. He writes:

“The problem with populism is that leaders rarely follow due process. Instead, they build reputations that are explicitly based on their willingness to break down institutional barriers in order to achieve their goals. Magufuli’s approach exemplifies this tendency.”

The author writes elsewhere in the same piece that, “The main problem with populism is that the early gains secured by leaders like Magufuli are rarely sustained.”
So, according to Cheeseman, failure or unwillingness to follow due process is a character of populist leaders. It is a view shared by Francis Fukuyama, who suggests that there are 3 main factors associated with the term i.e. (a) selection of policies that are popular in the short term but not sustainable in the long run, (b) a discourse that defines people/citizens in a restrictive way, for instance, on the basis of ethnic affiliation, and, (c) a focus on building a cult of personality. Moreover, Fukuyama anchors his analysis on the character or behavior considered to be normal to a 'modern state' (possibly as opposed to 'primordial' state). He (Fukuyama) argues that the modern state is, in treatment of its citizens, expected to uphold rule of law as well as democratic accountability.

Cas Mudde defines populism “as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups” – “the pure people” and the “corrupt elite.” Unlike Cheeseman, whose article gives an impression that populism is totally bad, Mudde points to its positive side, which is the idea that it brings to the limelight issues that matter to the majority, but that may not necessarily please the elite. And that its downside is that, it “is a monist and moralist ideology” that “rejects the legitimacy of political opponents.”
So, how bad is President Magufuli`s populism? The clue may lie in the actions he has taken, and examples that his critics have singled out. This takes me back to Cheeseman's article. He writes that;

“Many of his most celebrated acts, such as dismissing corrupt or ineffective government employees, did not follow due process. Instead, institutional rules for reviewing performance and removing staff were ignored in favour of presidential directives.”

It is important to remember that President Magufuli came to power when actions against the corrupt or irresponsible were rare, and when they happened, an exception. Therefore, “institutional rules for reviewing performance and removing staff” were in place, but their application was lax. For instance, instead of being fired for having committed a gross misconduct, an official would be re-assigned. Restoration of (institutional) discipline was key and a signal that the times have changed, had to come from the very top. 

Unfortunately, this has had to happen across the entire government. In addition, these actions have not culminated into replacement of regular procedures. Isn't a temporary 'outside'  intervention justified? What the sackings do is that they raise the cost of complacency – which is something needed to compel office holders to take action or be shown the door.
How about restrictions on political activity? Restriction, and harassment, does not seem to originate from (outright) rejection of opposition's legitimacy. Instead, it stems from a sense of political vulnerability, embodied in a relatively narrow victory that brought him to power. On this aspect, rules have (continuously) been ignored, since at least Mkapa's era. A question remains whether treatment will be different after 2020, if he will be serving his final term. Moreover, a sense of dissatisfaction, which has been attributed to the austerity policy, may be an equalizer. An upcoming by-election offers an opportunity to check the extent to which complaints over difficult living conditions may have undercut the President's popularity.
Reforms in extractive industries show a clear focus on strengthening the enforcement of existing rules and formulation of new ones. The recent appointment of Professor Luoga – a seasoned tax expert – as the next Governor of the Bank of Tanzania (BOT) also points in the same direction. It remains to be seen whether the involvement of the Presidency will decline, once a settlement has been achieved.

The ability of the current regime to sustain 'popular' policies such as tuition-free education and large investment in infrastructure will depend on the nature of the financing (debt or internal sources) and overall performance of the economy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) rates the risk of 'debt distress' for Tanzania as low.

Although elites have been bruised by a crackdown on corruption and inefficiency, the 'masses' have not always had a good day. For instance, while unplanned settlements were demolished in Dar es Salaam, the President urged a 'human face' in Mwanza, because they voted for him. Many will recall controversial government response to the earthquake in Kagera, especially the decision to bar direct support to (poor) victims, and rerouting donations to rehabilitate government institutions. Some analysts have even wondered whether this is, really, a regime that cares about the poor. 
The few examples above show that Magufuli's populism isn't a typical case of pure masses, against the corrupt elite, or a total focus on ignoring rules, and pursuing unsustainable policies. He has worked to address institutional weaknesses, in some sections, while taking advantage of systemic (read constitutional) gaps that allow him to consolidate power. His approach is characterized by many contradictions and, informed by diverse incentives. This understanding may help explain why “criticisms do not seem to have much effect on the citizenry who continue to support and defend” him. Many still believe that he means well for the country. May it be the case.

Thursday, October 26, 2017

Initiating Local Content in Agriculture?

Localizing (Local) Content in Agriculture or Locating One's Name in It?

Dastan Kweka

Local content in extractive industries (oil and gas) seems to have become a buzzword less than a decade since Tanzania discovered significant quantities of natural gas. While there is work to do to improve regulation - and consultation - there is, also, a room to explore linkages with other sectors, especially agriculture. Nevertheless, assuming that local content is non-existent in other sectors (read agriculture), just because there is no sector-specific policy, amounts to starting off on the wrong foot.

The Natural Gas Policy (2013) defines local content as; “added value brought to Tanzanians through activities of the natural gas industry.” The policy adds, “These may be measured and undertaken through employment and training of local workforce; investments in developing supplies and services locally; and procuring supplies of services locally.” 

Moreover, the Local Content Policy (2014) defines local content as:

“The added value brought to the country in the activities of the oil and gas industry in the United Republic of Tanzania through the participation and development of local Tanzanians and local businesses through national labour, technology, goods, services, capital and research capability.”

Although both definitions are relatively narrow – confined to oil/natural gas, the (natural gas) policy recognizes the importance of establishing linkages with 'other strategic sectors', such as agriculture – a sector that employs more than 67 percent of the population and accounts for one-third of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 

Other actors have, notably, recognized the importance of going beyond linkages. For instance, the Agricultural Council of Tanzania (ACCT) and Science, Technology and Innovation Policy Research Organization (STIPRO) - are already calling for a sector specific local-content policy. In advancing its agenda, the ACT position paper observes that: 

“The development of local content policy in many countries has advanced mainly in the oil and gas sector, and less so in the agricultural sector. However, for Tanzania whose economy is heavily dependent on agriculture, and where the government is making deliberate attempts to attract foreign investment into the sector, it is important to have a local content policy that will ensure that foreign investment results in a broad-based agricultural growth. This is especially considering the fact that close to 80% of the population depends on agriculture for their livelihoods.”

Indeed, Tanzania is making deliberate attempts to attract Foreign Directive Investments (FDIs) and has continued to perform relatively well. See the map below:

FDIs are, generally, built on the promise of (maximizing) local content benefits i.e. jobs, business opportunities, skills transfer and capacity building etc. Take the example of  the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) on jobs: 

“The SAGCOT Investment Blueprint, states that the GoT [Government of Tanzania] seeks to attract US$2.1 billion of new agribusiness investment over the next 20 years in order to bring at least 350,000 additional hectares into commercial production incorporating Tanzanian smallholders into internationally competitive supply chains. Much of this will be expanded smallholder production. In the process, the SAGCOT Program aims to create at least 420,000 new jobs and lift more than 2 million people out of poverty.”

And in terms of technology transfer, SAGCOT's Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Geoffrey Kirenga, notes:

“We observed with satisfaction, for example, that smallholder farmers are very receptive to new technologies. Our efforts to give them appropriate support have enabled potato, soya and dairy farmers to enjoy a significant increase in productivity.”

The promise of (cheap) labour – a basic form of local content - features constantly in SAGCOT presentations on opportunities for investors in the corridor, and the project's blueprint is explicit on opportunities for suppliers. It is, therefore, surprising that SAGCOT's Head of Policy, Neema Lugangira, who describes herself as a local content expert, is bragging about “initiating” local content in agriculture (or within the corridor). Can efforts to ensure there is a “robust local content in place”, as she claims, amount to initiation? 

Corporate investment in agriculture is risky, and, smallholder farmers – often a weaker party in the Public Private Partnership (PPP) configuration, end up with fewer benefits (if any) than anticipated. The famous BioShape case in Kilwa district is a case in point. In light of this situation, we should ask the 'champions' and 'initiators', whose local content are you advocating? Maybe the answer is in SAGCOT's 2016 report, especially a statement from the chairman of its Board, Salum Shamte, as excerpted below:

“Our investment in new opportunities broke ground on a significant expansion of investment by many of our partners. To mention a few, we are proud of Asas Dairies Unilever, YARA, Seed-Co, Syngenta, Mtanga Farms, Kilombero Plantation Ltd., and Silverlands. We have also seen increased investment by many of our SME partners such as Darsh Industries, Litenga Holdings, Rafael Group, Beula Seeds and many others. We are also very encouraged by the response of smallholder farmers. Many of them have demonstrated willingness to learn and work together. Associations and cooperatives are learning new ways to work efficiently and increase production and productivity.”

So, while new (business) 'partners' are investing or going for expansion, smallholder farmers are being taught 'new ways of work', as SAGCOT seeks to achieve “responsible commercialization of agriculture.” 

It is important to highlight the issue of (and potential for improving) local content in agriculture. And if done well, names will be earned! But ignoring facts, and exaggerating one's role, is not a better way to do it.

Karibu kwenye ulingo wa kutafakari kuhusu tunapotoka,tulipo,tuendako na namna ambavyo tutafika huko tuendako/Welcome to a platform for reflecting on where we are coming from, where we are, where we are going and how we will get there

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